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EFFECTIVE JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ANTIDUMPING
DETERMINATIONS
Increasing competition from foreign firms in domestic markets is fo-
cusing attention on the administration of the U.S. Antidumping Act.I The
Act authorizes the imposition of additional duties on goods that injure do-
mestic industries through their importation into the United States at a price
lower than their home market price.2 Although Congress designed the Act
as a means of controlling unfair competition in international trade,3 domes-
tic producers can manipulate the Act's provisions to impede fair competi-
tion in American markets. 4 The steady increase in the number of
antidumping complaints processed by the two agencies that administer the
Act5 and the rise in the number of affirmative dumping determinations re-
quiring the imposition of special duties6 stress the need for additional safe-
guards to ensure the effective and impartial application of the Act.7
Suggested procedural reforms include the adoption of a "meeting competi-
1. Antidumping Act of 1921, §§ 201-212, 19 U.S.C. §§ 160-171 (1976). For example,
controversy over the importation of electronic television sets from Japan recently led to con-
gressional hearings on the administration of the antidumping laws. Administration of the
AntidumpingAct of 1921: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways
and Means, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). Allegations of ineffective enforcement of the
antidumping laws also were raised in early 1979. N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1979, at D1, col. 6; N.Y.
Times, Feb. 6, 1979, at AO-Al 1 (rejoinder). Several bills purporting to address this and re-
lated issues were introduced during the first weeks of the 96th Congress. See, e.g., S. 264, 96th
Cong., Ist Sess., 125 CONG. REC. S883 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1979); S. 223, 96th Cong., Ist Sess.,
125 CONG. REc. S657 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1979); H.R. 1141, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG.
REc. H189 (daily ed. Jan. 18, 1979); H.R. 2597, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. H1067
(daily ed. Mar. 5, 1979).
2. 19 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1976).
3. The common origin of the Antidumping Act and domestic antitrust legislation has
been noted by the commentators. See, e.g., Fisher, The Antidumping Law of the United States:
4 Legal and Economic Analysis, 5 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 85, 93 (1973).
4. Coudert, The 4pplication of the United StatesAntidumping Law in the Light of a Liberal
Trade Policy, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 189, 216 (1965).
5. See Administrative Survey. October 1976 to September 1977, International Trade Com-
mission, 10 L. & POIv INT'L BUS. 1, 12 n.1 10 (1978) (forecasting significant increases in the
number of antidumping investigations); Fisher, supra note 3, at 144.
6. See Note, Innovation and Confusion in Recent Determinations of the Tariff Commission
Under theAntidumping Act, 4 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 212, 213 (1971). For a more recent
analysis of dispositions by the International Trade Commission, see Administrative Survey,
supra note 5, at 14-24.
7. In addition to procedural reforms, many commentators urge substantive reform of the
Antidumping Act. See, e.g., Barcelo, Antidumping Laws as Barriers to Trade-The United
States and the Internationalintidumping Code, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 491 (1972); Fisher, supra
note 3, at 148-53.
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tion" defense to antidumping allegations,8 application of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act (APA)9 to such investigations, and expansion of the
scope and standard of review of dumping determinations.
This Note will examine this third suggestion: ensuring effective judi-
cial review of antidumping determinations. First, the procedures presently
employed in the determination of and appeal from dumping findings will
be described. Second, the Note will explore the limitations of the existing
scope of judicial review of these findings. Finally, three alternative ap-
proaches for expanding the scope of review and clarifying the appropriate
standard will be discussed.
ADMINISTRATION OF THE ANTIDUMPING ACT
A. THE DUMPING FINDING
The Treasury Department and the International Trade Commission
jointly administer the Antidumping Act.' 0 The Secretary of the Treasury
exercises authority over'questions involving the existence of discriminato-
rily low prices of imported merchandise." The International Trade Coin-
8. See [1978] 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 50,371, at 55,813 (Speech by John H.
Shenefield, Chief, Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice). See also Statement of the United
States Department of Justice Before the United States Tariff Commission, In re Elemental
Sulphur from Mexico, USITC Investigation AA1921-92 at 11-21 (1972) (urging International
Trade Commission to consider "meeting competition" defense)(on file at the Cornell Interna-
ional Law Journal).
9. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1976). See Shenefield,
supra note 8.
10. Until 1954, the Treasury Department possessed sole authority to administer the
Antidumping Act. Passage of the Customs Simplification Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-768,
§ 301, 68 Stat. 1138 (1954) transferred to the Tariff Commission responsibility for investiga-
tions and determinations of injury to domestic industries caused by the importation of foreign
goods. The recognized expertise of the Tariff Commission in deciding such issues as well as
the inadequate staffing of the Treasury Department led to this change. See Customs Sim li ca.
tion Act of 1954 Hearings on H.)A 9476 Before the House Ways and Means Comm.,83d Cong.,
2d Sess. 14, 40-41 (1954). For a partially dated criticism of the post-1954 division of adminis-
trative authority, see Schwartz, The Administration by the Department of the Treasury ofthe
Laws Authorizing the Imposition ofAntidumping Dutles, 14 VA. J. Ir'L L. 463, 476-80 (1974).
The addition of§ 201(c) to the Antidumping Act in 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976), met some
of Professor Schwartz' objections.
Congress subsequently transformed the Tariff Commission into the International Trade
Commission through the enactment of the Trade Reform Act of 1974, § 171, 19 U.S.C. § 2231
(1976).
11. "ITihe Secretary of the Treasury. . .determines that a class or kind of foreign mer-
chandise is being, or is likely to be, sold in the United States or elsewhere at less than its fair
value .. " 19 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1976). The Secretary's finding is normally referred to as the
"less than fair value (LTFV)" determination and amounts to a comparison of the home market
price of the import (or its fair value) to the price charged in the United States. The regulations
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mission conducts investigations into allegations of injury to domestic
industries caused by the questioned importation. 12 Dumping duties are im-
posed only if each of the four steps of the antidumping investigation results
in an affirmative determination.
First, the Secretary of the Treasury conducts an informal investigation
to determine the probable validity of the dumping allegation. 13 A finding
that allegations of either discriminatory pricing or domestic injury are un-
warranted terminates the proceedings. If substantial doubt appears as to the
substance of the alleged injury, the International Trade Commission con-
ducts an expedited investigation of this question.14 If the Commission finds
no reasonable indication of injury, the Secretary of the Treasury halts the
proceeding.
Second, a formal dumping investigation commences in which the Sec-
retary of the Treasury inquires into the existence or likelihood of sales at
less than fair value.' 5 The Secretary publishes the determination and a
negative finding terminates the investigation.
Third, the International Trade Commission institutes a companion in-
vestigation to determine the existence or likelihood of injury to a domestic
industry. 16 A finding of injury does not necessarily follow from a finding
confirming sales at less than fair value. A negative injury determination
closes the investigation but an affirmative finding results in the entry of a
dumping finding by the Secretary of the Treasury.
Fourth, customs officials must determine the existence of a "dumping
margin" on each entry of imported merchandise covered by the dumping
governing the determination of these prices appear in 19 C.F.R. § 153 (1978). The less than
fair value calculation can be quite complicated depending on the price information available.
See Note, Treasury Runs the Maze. Less Than Fair Value Determinations Under the Anti-
dumpingAct of 1921, 8 GA. J. INTL & COMP. L. 919 (1978). For a general overview of less
than fair value proceedings, see Myerson, A Review of CurrentAntidumping Procedures: United
States Law and the Case of Japan, 15 COLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 167 (1976).
12. The Act directs the International Trade Commission to determine "whether an indus-
try in the United States is being or is likely to be injured, or is prevented from being estab-
lished, by reason of the importation of such [less than fair value] merchandise into the United
States." 19 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1976). Substantive analyses of the Commission's injury determi-
nations appear in Coudert, supra note 4, at 204-16; Myerson, supra note 11, at 181-87; and
Note, supra note 6.
13. 19 U.S.C. § 160(c)(1) (1976). This preliminary investigation must be conducted within
30 days of the Secretary's receipt of a dumping allegation. Id
14. The Commission conducts its inquiry within 30 days. Id § 160(c)(2). For an analysis
of this provision, see McDermid & Foster, The U.S. International Trade Commission's 30-Day
Inquiry Under the Antidumping Act: Section 201(c)(2), 27 MERCER L. REV. 657 (1976).
15. This inquiry normally lasts six months but the Secretary of the Treasury may extend it
by three months in more complicated cases. 19 U.S.C. § 160(b)(2) (1976).
16. The International Trade Commission's investigation commences after the Secretary of
the Treasury issues an affirmative finding of less than fair value sales and is limited to three
months, with no provision for extension. Id § 160(a).
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finding. The dumping margin is the difference between the foreign market
value and the purchaser's or exporter's sales price.' 7 All unappraised mer-
chandise18 described in the dumping finding is subject to special dumping
duties in an amount equal to the dumping margin calculated for each sepa-
rate entry of the goods.' 9 However, dumping margins do not exist in all
instances in which goods are subject to a dumping finding.20
B. PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS
Although Congress delegated vast discretion to both the Treasury De-
partment and the International Trade Commission to conduct such investi-
gations "as [they] shall deem necessary," 21 it also placed important
limitations upon the exercise of this discretion. Congress limited the dura-
tion of the antidumping investigation to nine months22 and provided for the
expedition of the proceedings in doubtful cases23 to curtail harassment of
importers and foreign manufacturers through the institution of unfounded
antidumping complaints. As a further safeguard, the Treasury Department
17. Although in form the "dumping margin" conforms to the less than fair value formula,
the former calculation is more precise and may point to the conclusion that no dumping oc-
curred or that it was de minimus. See Note, supra note 11, at 934.
18. A notice directing customs officers to withhold appraisement on the class or kind of
merchandise under investigation accompanies publication of an affirmative less than fair value
determination. 19 U.S.C. § 160(b)(l)(B) (1976). For discussion of the withholding of ap-
praisement requirement, see Conner & Buschlinger, The United States Antidumping Act: A
Timely Survey, 7 VA. J. INT'L L. 117, 129-32 (Dec. 1966); Coudert, supra note 4, at 197-202.
19. 19 U.S.C. § 161(a) (1976) provides:
In the case of all imported merchandise, whether dutiable or free of duty, of a class
or kind as to which the Secretary of the Treasury has made public a finding ....
entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption, not more than one hundred
and twenty days before the question of dumping was raised by or presented to the
Secretary... and as to which no appraisement has been made before such finding
has been so made public, if the purchase price or the exporter's sales price is less than
the foreign market value ... there shall be levied, collected, and paid, in addition to
any other duties imposed thereon by law, a special dumping duty in an amount equal
to such difference.
20. See SCM Corp. v. United States, 450 F. Supp. 1178, 1180 (Cust. Ct. 1978). Customs
officials determine dumping margins for each individual entry and subsequent entries of the
merchandise subject to the dumping finding may reflect price increases commensurate with the
dumping margin. But see note 68 infra and accompanying text.
21. 19 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1976). The adoption of regulations outlining the procedures fol-
lowed and information considered by each agency helped define the scope of the investigation
"deemed necessary." See 19 C.F.R. § 153 (1978) (Treasury guidelines); id §§ 201, 207 (Inter-
national Trade Commission guidelines). However, both agencies retain extensive latitude in
gathering information. Treasury Department investigators may obtain any information not
expressly provided for in the regulations as deemed necessary to enable the Secretary to reach
a determination. Id § 153.31(a). For a similar provision governing Commission activities, see
id § 201.9.
22. See notes 15-16 supra.
23. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
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and the International Trade Commission are required to hold a hearing
upon the request of any party to the investigation. 24 But to preserve the
"informal and nonadversary nature of the proceedings," 25 Congress specifi-
cally exempted these hearings from the procedural requirements of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act.26
The Antidumping Act also requires notice by publication of the com-
mencement of an antidumping investigation and of the individual determi-
nations of each agency so that the parties can effectively assert their
interests before the agency or a court.27 In addition, a statement of findings
and conclusions, including the supporting substantive reasons, must accom-
pany the publication of each dumping determination.
C. PROTEST AND APPEAL
The Antidumping Act does not specifically grant the right to appeal
less than fair value and injury determinations. Rather, protests and appeals
24. 19 U.S.C. § 160(d)(l) (1976) provides:
Before making any determination . . . , the Secretary or the Commission, as the
case may be, shall, at the request of any foreign manufacturer or exporter, or any
domestic importer, of the foreign merchandise in question, or of any domestic manu-
facturer, producer, or wholesaler of merchandise of the same class or kind, conduct a
hearing at which-
(A) any such person shall have the right to appear by counsel or in person; and
(B) any other person, firm, or corporation may make application and, upon good
cause shown, may be allowed by the Secretary or the Commission, as the case may be,
to intervene and appear at such hearing by counsel or in person.
25. S. RFP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 172, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 7186, 7309.
26. 19 U.S.C. § 160(d)(3) (1976). This subsection provides that the antidumping hearings
are not governed by 5 U.S.C. §§ 554-557, 702 (1976). These provisions deal with formal adju-
dicative hearings and the right of judicial review. As nonadjudicative proceedings, the hear-
ings held in the course of an antidumping investigation do not produce a complete record for
review.
27. 19 U.S.C. § 160(d)(2) (1976) provides:
The Secretary, upon determining whether foreign merchandise is being, or is likely
to be, sold in the United States at less than its fair value, and the Commission, upon
making its [injury] determination. . . shall publish in the Federal Register such deter-
mination, whether affirmative or negative, together with a complete statement of find-
ings and conclusions, and the reasons or bases therefor, on all the material issues of
fact or law presented (consistent with confidential treatment granted by the Secretary
or the Commission, as the case may be, in the course of making its determination).
In adding this provision, Congress intended
that sufficient information be provided in the case of each [less than fair value and
injury] determination to enable all interested parties to be aware of the reasons for,
and details of, such determinations and to effectively protect their rights in proceed-
ings before the Department of the Treasury and the Commission, as well as in the
courts.
S. REP. No. 1298, supra note 25, at 171, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
7186, 7309.
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of the imposition of dumping duties are permitted only as provided in the
general provisions of the tariff laws. 28
Sections 514 and 516 of the Tariff Act of 1930 govern protests of cus-
toms duties.2 9 These sections limit both the class of complainants and the
subject of its protests. Section 514 permits those persons directly associated
with the importation of the goods in issue30 to protest the "decisions of the
appropriate customs officer, including the legality- of all orders and findings
entering into the same" relating to the assessment of customs duties.31 Sec-
tion 516 allows American manufacturers, producers, or wholesalers to con-
test the classification, rate, or amount of duties imposed as well as the
failure to assess special dumping duties.32 In addition, one subsection of
section 516 permits these domestic parties to contest negative less than fair
value determinations. 33
The United States Customs Court possesses exclusive jurisdiction over
all civil actions involving administrative orders imposing dumping duties34
and all actions brought by domestic parties under section 516.3 - As prereq-
uisites for suit under section 514, a protest must be filed and denied,36 and
all duties, charges, or other exactions must be paid in full. 37 For actions
brought under section 516, all remedies provided under that section must be
exhausted.38 The United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals en-
tertains appeals from the decisions of the Customs Court.39
28. [TJhe determination of the appropriate customs officer as to the foreign market
value or the constructed value, as the case may be, the purchase price, and the ex-
porter's sales price, and the action of such customs officer in assessing special dumping
duty, shall have the same force and effect and be subject to the same right fprotest,
under the same conditions and subject to the same limitations; the United States Cus-
toms Court, and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals shallhave the samejurisdic-
lion, powers, and duties in connection with such appeals and protests as in the case of
protests relating to customs duties under existing law.
19 U.S.C. § 169 (1976) (emphasis added).
29. Id §§ 1514, 1516.
30. The statute restricts the right of protest to the "importer, consignee, or any authorized
agent of the person paying any charge or exaction,. . . or seeking [the] entry or delivery [of
goods upon which customs duties are imposed]." Id § 1514(b)(1).
31. Id § 1514(a). Importers may protest decisions as to appraised value, classification,
rate and amount of duties charged, and exclusion orders. Id
32. Id § 1516(a).
33. Id § 1516(d). Section 1514 does not grant a comparable right to contest affirmative
less than fair value determinations to the parties within its scope.
34. 28 U.S.C. § 1582(a) (1976).
35. ld § 1582(b).
36. Id § 1582(c)(1). The protest must be filed in accordance with § 514, and denied pur-
suant to § 515, 19 U.S.C. § 1515 (1976).
37. 28 U.S.C. § 1582(c)(2) (1976).
38. Id § 1582(c)(1).
39. Id § 1541.
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II
PRESENT SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
A. THE TRADITIONAL STANDARD OF LIMITED REVIEW
Although the Customs Court regards dumping findings as review-
able,40 it retains a marked aversion to scrutinizing the facts culminating in
such determinations. The touchstone for analyzing the scope of judicial
review remains the early case of Kleberg & Co. v. United States.4 1 The
importer in Kleberg challenged the validity of the Secretary of the Treas-
ury's affirmative dumping finding and urged the court to assess indepen-
dently whether the facts justified the finding. The Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals declined, ruling that so long as the Secretary follows "every
statutory step required by the law," 42 the court "may not judicially inquire
into the correctness of his conclusions. . . . [T]he judicial power extends
only to a correction of his failure to proceed according to and within the
law."4 3
In applying the Kleberg rule, the court may not substitute its judgment
for that of the agency to which Congress delegated the discretion to deter-
mine dumping violations. 4 As the Kleberg court stated, "[W]e are not at
liberty here to go into an investigation as to whether the facts shown on the
trial below justified the issuance of the order complained of."45 Although
the Kleberg rule prohibits inquiry into exercises of discretion entrusted to
the Secretary of the Treasury or the International Trade Commission, it
does require judicial review of the application of the law by these agencies.
The court assesses only whether the agency exceeded its statutory authority
in construing such terms as "fair value," "industry," or "injury."'46
The court in Ellis K. Orlowitz Co. v. United States47 further clarified
40. See, e.g., SCM Corp. v. United States, 450 F. Supp. 1178, 1188 (Cust. Ct. 1978). But
see Sneaker Circus, Inc. v. Carter, 457 F. Supp. 771, 787 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (discretionary deter-
minations not subject to judicial review).
41. 71 F.2d 332 (C.C.P.A. 1933).
42. Id at 334.
43. Id at 335.
44. See, ag., United States v. Elof Hansson, Inc., 296 F.2d 779 (C.C.P.A. 1960), cert. de-
nied, 368 U.S. 899 (1961). Citing the operant language of Kleberg without further comment,
the Hansson court refused to substitute its findings for those of the Treasury Secretary by
declining to reevaluate the evidence forming the basis of the Secretary's injury determination.
296 F.2d at 783.
45. 71 F.2d at 335.
46. One issue considered in Kleberg was the proper construction of "fair value." The
Secretary defined the term in accordance with a Treasury regulation and the court sustained
the reasonableness of this definition following discussion of the common meaning of the words
and intent of Congress. Id
47. 200 F. Supp. 302 (Cust. Ct. 1961).
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the scope of review under Kleberg. As in Keberg, the importer attacked
the validity of a dumping order, focusing upon the Tariff Commission's
interpretation of "industry" in its injury determination. The court deemed
determinations made pursuant to an agency's "executive discretion" to be
free from judicial interference. Excesses or abuses of executive discretion,
however, represented appropriate subjects for judicial review.48 The court
thus distinguished between review of the agency's fact-finding function-
"the discretion. . . to find from duly presented facts that there is actual or
threatened injury"49-and review of the agency's statutory interpretation.
This distinction reflected the court's respect for the agency's expertise in
assessing the technical economic data assembled in antidumping investiga-
tions, yet acknowledged the court's own expertise on questions of law.
In two more recent cases, the United States Customs Court attempted
to expand the restrictive scope of review established in Kleberg by relying
on the standards of the Administrative Procedure Act. In City Lumber Co.
v. United States,50 the court incorporated that Act's substantial evidence
standard into the Kleberg rule before dismissing an importer's appeal of an
injury determination. The importer argued that the Tariff Commission ex-
ceeded its statutory authority by basing its injury determination on imper-
missible data.51 But the court found that an "examination of the
voluminous record discloses substantial evidence in support of the facts ,et
forth in the [Tariff Commission's] majority statement .... *52 This use of
the substantial evidence standard exceeded the boundaries of the rule limit-
ing factual review laid down in Kleberg. The court's use of this new stan-
dard apparently resulted from its conclusion that "legal and proper"
dumping findings must be based upon less than fair value and injury deter-
minations supported by substantial evidence. 53 By this reasoning, the re-
viewing court would incorporate an additional procedural requirement into
the statute: agency determinations must be based upon substantial evi-
48. "While judges should refrain from reviewing executive discretion, they should be slow
to deny to litigants the opportunity which our constitutional system affords for a judicial re-
view of executive compliance with the terms laid down by the legislature, under which the
delegated discretion is to be exercised." Id at 305.
49. Id
50. 290 F. Supp. 385 (Cust. Ct. 1968), aft'd, 311 F. Supp. 340 (Cst. Ct. 1970), a~?'d, 457
F.2d 991 (C.C.P.A. 1972).
51. The antidumping investigation concerned portland gray cement imported from Portu-
gal. The plaintiff contended that the Tariff Commission predicated its injury determination
upon importations of this type of cement from countries other than Portugal. 290 F. Supp. at
387.
52. Id at 390.
53. In its second conclusion of law, the court determined that substantial evidence sup-
ported the injury finding and "it follows that the finding of dumping was legal and proper."
Id at 394.
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dence as revealed by the record. The Appellate Term of the Customs Court
expressly adopted the trial court's approach. 54 The Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals approved the result but refused to modify the Kleberg rule
to allow the courts to "weigh the evidence before the Commission or to
question the correctness of [its] findings. '55
The importer in Imbert Imports, Inc. v. United States56 claimed that
the Tariff Commission acted arbitrarily and without the support of substan-
tial evidence in reaching its affirmative injury determination. Rejecting
that claim, the trial judge explained that the appropriate scope of review in
antidumping proceedings focuses on two areas: procedure-whether the
agency acted within its delegated authority-and theory of law-whether
the agency correctly construed the pertinent statutory language.57 Al-
though entitling the plaintiffs "to a measure of review," 58 this approach did
not permit the more extensive factual review they sought.
The Appellate Term suggested that review might extend to arbitrary
and capricious acts, but did not reach that issue since it remained un-
persuaded that the injury finding was "arbitrary, an abuse of discretion or
otherwise contrary to law."' 59 The court, however, did expressly disapprove
the use of the substantial evidence standard in the review of injury determi-
nations.60 The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals agreed in dictum that
the injury determination in issue was not arbitrary, but declined to rule on
whether this standard applied to antidumping proceedings. 61 Returning to
the Kleberg formulation, the court held that "the Commission here acted
within its delegated authority and correctly interpreted and applied the
law." 62
Despite the dissent of the lower courts, the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals thus adheres to the standard enunciated in Kleberg and re-
54. Noting that the court below "properly considered all of the evidence in the case, and
[its] findings of fact are fully supported by the substantial weight of the evidence," the Appel-
late Term expressly adopted "each and every finding of fact and conclusion of law" made by
that court. 311 F. Supp. at 349.
55. 457 F.2d at 994. Rather, the court reaffirmed the Kleberg rule by holding: "As stated
in Kleberg, our review of determinations of injury or likelihood of injury in antidumping cases
does not extend beyond determining whether the Commission has acted within its delegated
authority, has correctly interpreted statutory language, and has correctly applied the law." Id
56. 314 F. Supp. 784 (Cust. Ct. 1970), a'd, 331 F. Supp. 1400 (Cust. Ct. 1971), aj'd, 475
F.2d 1189 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
57. 314 F. Supp. at 787.
58. Id
59. 331 F. Supp. at 1405.
60. The court labelled the substantial evidence standard "inappropriate in reviewing in-
jury determinations." Id
61. 475 F.2d at 1192. The court also found the findings of the Commission to be sup-
ported by substantial evidence but it did not consider the appropriateness of that standard. Id
62. Id
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stricts its inquiry to questions of procedure and statutory interpretation.
This approach prohibits review of the facts supporting the dumping finding.
B. THE NEED FOR REFORM
The present framework for appealing dumping orders and their under-
lying factual determinations contains several disquieting aspects. Some do-
mestic groups, such as labor unions and consumer groups, insist that their
interests are not adequately represented in antidumping proceedings. Un-
equal treatment of importers and domestic producers under the Anti-
dumping Act persists despite congressional concern. In addition, the
judicial gloss upon the statutory mechanism of appeal has increased uncer-
tainty concerning the applicable scope and standard of review.
Labor unions or trade associations whose members face layoffs as a
result of the injury caused domestic producers by dumping desire to inter-
vene in antidumping proceedings. 63 Similarly, consumer groups seek a
voice in these proceedings to argue against the artifically high domestic
prices that result from the imposition of dumping duties.6 Under existing
law, however, none of these groups can participate in the antidumping pro-
ceedings.
Importers and foreign manufacturers cannot obtain prompt review of
the findings underlying the imposition of dumping duties.65 Unlike domes-
tic parties, who may contest negative less than fair value determinations
immediately upon notification of the agency's decision,66 importers and
their affiliates must wait to contest until dumping duties are assessed and
liquidated.67 Because of this framework, many importers may not even at-
tempt to avail themselves of the reappraisal procedure and may instead
raise prices by the amount of dumping duties assessed. 68
The mechanism governing appeals from dumping orders reflects the
63. See Customs CourtsAct of 1978: Hearing on S 2857Before the Subcomm. on Improve-
ments in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 219
(1978) (testimony of Rudolph Oswald, Director of Research, AFL-CIO) [hereinafter cited as
Hearing on S. 2857].
64. See Consumers Union v. Committee for the Implementation of Textile Agreements,
561 F.2d 872 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 933 (1978).
65. For example, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals resolved Orlowitz eight years
after the injury determination and dumping finding were made. See Metzger & Musrey, Judi-
cial Review of Tariff Commission Actions and Proceedings, 56 CORNELL L. REv. 285, 330
(1971). Situations such as this one may not occur as frequently in the future because of provi-
sions for expedited review.
66. 19 U.S.C. § 1516(d) (1976).
67. See text accompanying notes 36-37 supra.
68. By so doing, the importer does not forfeit the amount of the dumping margin to the
U.S. Government but does lose his chance to contest the imposition of the dumping duty. But
see Hendrick, The United States AntidumpingAct, 58 AM. J. INT'L L. 914, 932-33 (1964) (only
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confusion created through a broad judicial reading of a narrbw statute.
The Antidumping Act restricts appeals to classification and appraisal con-
troversies arising from the actions of customs officers.69 By their nature,
these reappraisal actions also entail some review of less than fair value de-
terminations.70 But no comparable review of injury determinations is
within the literal terms of the Act. The courts, however, consider less than
fair value and injury determinations as well as dumping orders to be re-
viewable.7 1 To achieve this result, the courts have expanded review of the
imposition of dumping duties and the failure to assess such duties to en-
compass review of the determinations forming the basis of such action.72
Through its creative reading of the statute, the judiciary achieves review of
all elements of antidumping protests but at the cost of a rational standard of
review.
The usual review authorized for customs litigation is trial de novo.73
21% of cases between 1955 and 1964 clearly indicate such price revision). See also Coudert,
supra note 4, at 217-18.
69. The Antidumping Act authorizes only review of the actions of customs officers. See
note 28 supra.
70. The determination of the dumping margin by customs officers is somewhat similar to
the less than fair value determination by the Treasury Department. See note 17 supra.
71. See SCM Corp. v. United States, 450 F. Supp. 1178, 1189-90 (Cust. Ct. 1978).
72. In a recent decision, the Customs Court affirmed its jurisdiction to review the validity
of not only the final dumping order but also the intermediate negative less than fair value and
injury determinations. SCM Corp. v. United States, 450 F. Supp. 1178 (Cust. Ct. 1978). SCM
argued against the reviewability of no injury determinations on the ground that although
§ 1516(d) expressly provides for review of negative less than fair value determinations no com-
parable section authorizes review of no injury determinations. In rejecting this argument,
Chief Judge Re examined the legislative history of §§ 1516(c)-(d). Finding no congressional
intent to preclude judicial review of no injury determinations, he interpreted the scope of re-
view of the "failure to assess antidumping duties" under § 1516(c) to include the review of
negative less than fair value and injury determinations.
The validity of this interpretation of the legislative history is questionable because Congress
apparently equated "negative antidumping determinations," the statutory objects of review,
with "negative price discrimination (LTFV) determinations" and made no mention of negative
injury determinations. See S. REP. No. 1298, supra note 25, at 178, reprinted in [1974] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. Naws 7186, 7314-15. The conclusion that the failure of the statutory
scheme to include review of no injury determinations resulted from omission is bolstered by
the fact that the legislative history provides no clue as to why expedited treatment is granted
review of negative less than fair value determinations but not negative injury determinations.
This analysis supports the proposition that the "failure to assess antidumping duties" refers to
the customs officer's failure to impose dumping duties on particular merchandise (a classifica-
-tion issue) and does not provide for comprehensive review of antidumping determinations.
See Coudert, supra note 4, at 203.
Judge Re's interpretation would be undercut further by a bill currently pending in Congress
to amend the Antidumping Act to provide explicitly for review of the Secretary's decisions
relating to fair market value but not for review of the Commission's injury determinations.
S. 223, supra note 1, § 106 (amending 19 U.S.C. § 169).
73. Gerhart, Judicial Review of Customs Service Actions, 9 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1101,
-1-149 (1 77).
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Most appeals involve questions concerning classification, rate, or amount of
duty and such actions lend themselves well to recompilation of the perti-
nent evidence before the court. Pure de novo adjudication does not occur,
however, since the court does not independently adjudge the contested is-
sues. Agency determinations carry a presumption of validity and the bur-
den of proving these incorrect rests upon the challenging party.74 The
review of antidumping proceedings does not neatly fit this format. The
data collected and relied upon in formulating agency determinations is
quite technical and beyond the expertise of the courts.7" In addition, judges
should not be permitted to assess independently the relevance of these facts
in light of the congressional intent that the agency exercise this function.
Recognizing the inappropriateness of de novo review to antidumping
proceedings, the courts have attempted to fashion a standard of review that
does not usurp the function of the agency. The standard which resulted,
that of Kleberg, permits limited but not necessarily effective review. In-
deed, the method presently employed by the courts provides only cursory
review of dumping findings and assumes that the underlying factual deter-
minations of price discrimination and injury are not reviewable.7 6 The stat-
utes restrict review to the legality of dumping findings;77 Kleberg limits
review of legality to a question of conformity with the statutory procedures.
Although the Treasury Department and the International Trade Commis-
sion promulgated detailed regulations governing their procedures for
processing antidumping complaints, these do not represent statutory proce-
dures. Failure to follow these regulations may well be an arbitrary or un-
reasonable action, but under Kleberg such action falls outside the existing
scope of judicial review.
The courts could alter this framework by recognizing their inherent
power to review arbitrary and capricious agency actions.78 The delegation
of discretion by Congress to the Treasury Department and the International
Trade Commission did not include the power to act arbitrarily or unreason-
ably. To the extent that an agency abuses its discretion by acting irration-
ally or without a reasonable basis in law, the courts possess the power to
74. Id
75. See Sneaker Circus, Inc. v. Carter, 457 F. Supp. 771, 787 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
76. Id Although Sneaker Circus involved a district court's review of a "good cause" de-
termination under § 201 of the Trade Reform Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (1976) (import
relief), the court's discussion of review is sufficiently general to be of interest here. The court
argued that the "good cause" determination could not be judicially reviewed because it en-
tailed a determination within the sole discretion of the agency.
77. 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a) (1976).
78. The courts would apply due process analysis. See Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness
and Judicial Review, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 88-89 (1965), and cases cited therein.
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overrule such action.79 By limiting review to the Kleberg standard, how-
ever, the courts have refused to expand the scope of their review of dump-
ing findings to this point without legislative direction.
Until recently, Congress apparently endorsed the judiciary's construc-
tion of the Antidumping Act. In 1974, it declined to include specific provi-
sions for review of individual agency determinations in its extensive reform
of the trade laws.80 Congress considered the present review procedures ad-
equate and relied on the authority granted the Treasury Department and
the International Trade Commission to "review, modify or revoke their de-
cisions."''s These two agencies review and revoke prior determinations
upon showings of discontinued less than fair value sales or changes in in-
dustry conditions.82 In both instances, the proceedings do not really
amount to a reconsideration of the facts supporting the original determina-
tions or an assessment of whether the facts justified the determination; the
revocation proceedings consist of independent findings based upon an al-
legedly new factual situation. At least one other difficulty8 3 that prevents
the revocation proceedings from providing effective review of agency deter-
minations is the time lag: in most cases, two years must elapse before either
agency considers initiating revocation proceedings. 84
79. Id at 64; see also Metzger & Musrey, supra note 65, at 330 (standard of review should
be rational basis in law for determinations).
80. S. REP. No. 1298, supra note 25, at 181, reprintedin [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
Naws 7186, 7318.
81. Id
82. The Treasury Department permits modification or revocation of less than fair value
determinations upon a showing of the abandonment of discriminatorily priced sales for a sub-
stantial period accompanied by assurances of no resumption of the practice. 19 C.F.R.
§ 153.44(a) (1978). The International Trade Commission reviews injury determinations if
changed circumstances exist indicating that upon revocation or modification of a dumping
finding no actual or threatened injury would occur to a domestic industry through the contin-
ued importation of the merchandise in question at less than its fair value. Id § 207.5(a).
"Changed circumstances" warranting revocation of an injury determination include the pres-
ent well-being of the domestic industries concerned, their future prospects (demand for the
product, production capacities, present operative capacity), present dumping margins, and the
failure to identify future less than fair value sales as a possible cause of future injury. For
examples of changed circumstances proceedings, see Primary Lead Metal from Australia and
Canada, 41 Fed. Reg. 17,628 (1976), and Northern Bleached Hardwood Kraft Pulp from
Canada, 39 Fed. Reg. 34,718 (1974).
83. In addition, there exists the obvious problem of the reviewing agency being one and
the same as the agency under review.
84. The Treasury Department entertains petitions for review after two years, but will re-
voke a finding on its own initiative after four years if satisfied that "there is no likelihood of
resumption of sales at less than fair value of the merchandise concerned." 19 C.F.R.
§§ 153.44(a)-(b) (1978). The International Trade Commission normally conducts reviews only
after two years, but will expedite its review upon a showing of good cause. Id § 207.5(c).
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III
TOWARD MORE EFFECTIVE JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
ANTIDUMPING DETERMINATIONS
Even though the courts have never overturned an agency finding under
the Antidumping Act,85 the availability of effective review should supply a
check upon the agencies and assure interested parties of the fair resolution
of issues presented. 86 However, the application of the antidumping law to
date has not ensured effective review of the factual determinations preced-
ing the issuance of a dumping finding. It is questionable whether some
determinations disposing of antidumping complaints are reviewable at all,
and the treatment of those that are differs depending on the party pressing
for review. This section will examine three alternative modifications of the
present system to determine their effectiveness in providing judicial review.
A. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AcT
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) was enacted more than a
decade after the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals decided Kleberg.87
Although the APA carried a strong presumption of applicability to all
agency actions in the absence of a congressional directive to the contrary,8 8
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals has refused to rule definitively on
whether the APA governs antidumping proceedings.8 9 While the court
awaits more specific legislative instructions, confusion persists concerning
the APA's relevance to antidumping actions.
The APA subjects an agency action to judicial review unless a statute
precludes review or the "action is committed to agency discretion by
law." 90 Although the Antidumping Act expressly provides only for judicial
review of appraisal actions, it does not explicitly prohibit review of the in-
termediate determinations of the Secretary of the Treasury and the Inter-
national Trade Commission. This silence regarding review of these factual
85. The Customs Court has reversed other determinations of the International Trade
Commission on narrow points of law but has not addressed the adequacy of the evidence
essential to an agency decision even though such review is routinely extended to the actions of
other regulatory agencies. No decision relating to less than fair value by the Secretary of the
Treasury has been overturned, but the court did reverse a countervailing duty determination,
which involves similar findings. See Energetic Worsted Co. v. United States, 53 C.C.P.A. 36
(1966).
86. See Berger, supra note 78, at 64.
87. Enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act occurred in 1946; the Court of Cus-
toms and Patent Appeals decided Keberg in 1933.
88. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971).
89. See, e.g., Imbert Imports, Inc. v. United States, 475 F.2d 1189, 1192 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
90. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1976).
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determinations could imply a congressional intent to preclude review, but
such inferred intent does not satisfy the constitutional requirement of clear
and convincing evidence of a legislative intent to restrict access to judicial
review.91
Whether these intermediate determinations are committed to agency
discretion presents a more difficult question. The trend is to view this ex-
ception quite narrowly; only in rare instances, when the statute is drawn so
broadly that no law exists for a reviewing court to apply, does the exception
govern. 92 Arguably, the Antidumping Act is such a statute since it confers
broad discretion upon the Secretary of the Treasury and International
Trade Commission to conduct their individual determinations. The 1974
amendments to this Act, however, gave some structure to these exercises of
discretion by requiring the preparation of a statement of reasons for each
less than fair value and injury determination. 93 These statements could
provide some guidelines for the courts to apply in reviewing antidumping
determinations. 94 Whether these guidelines would be sufficient to remove
antidumping proceedings from this narrow exception to the APA remains
an open question.
In the event that Congress expressly subjects antidumping proceedings
to the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, attention will focus
on the scope and applicable standard of review. To some extent, the scope
of review under the APA overlaps that of Kleberg in allowing the courts to
set aside actions outside an agency's delegated authority.95 The APA ex-
tends further, however, and allows the courts to "hold unlawful and set
aside agency action, findings and conclusions" found to be arbitrary and
capricious, unsupported by substantial evidence as revealed by an eviden-
tiary record, or unsupported by the facts compiled by the court during a
91. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971) (citation
omitted).
92. Id (citation omitted).
93. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
94. Perhaps this argument proves too much. If no law exists for a reviewing court to apply
before an agency renders its decision, can a series of such decisions be said to create the law?
The meaning of "committed to agency discretion" remains a mystery; one commentator sug-
gests that whenever law is applied, the action is reviewable. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
OF THE SEVENTIES, % 28.16 (1976). While the formula for the less than fair value standard is
set out in the regulations, see note I1 supra, no formalized standard of injury exists. See note
12 supra.
95. Exceeding delegated authority is a form of abusing discretion that is reviewable under
the Act. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976). Kleberg also permits review of such agency action to
determine whether the agency stayed within its statutory boundaries. See text accompanying
note 46 supra.
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trial de novo.96 Problems will arise, however, in applying this broader re-
view to antidumping proceedings.
The existing framework for appeals under the Antidumping Act would
frustrate the effective use of either the arbitrary and capricious or substan-
tial evidence standard. Confidential treatment renders much of the infor-
mation on which the agency bases its determinations unavailable to the
litigants and the courts. 97 The record before the reviewing court may not
even contain the data that the agency considered most persuasive. In addi-
tion, the parties are not permitted to test the assumptions, evidence, and
conclusions advanced by their opponents. The hearing allowed to the inter-
ested parties involves the submission of information and presentation of a
statement to the agency but does not permit cross-examination of the oppo-
sition. The agency may weigh the hearing as it chooses in its final determi-
nation, thus often reducing it to a device for placating the interested arties.
With such a meager record before it, a reviewing court could neither evalu-
ate the capriciousness of an agency determination nor search for substantial
evidentiary support for that action. In addition, the prevailing view in the
courts rejects the arbitrary and capricious, 98 substantial evidence, 99 and
trial de novo'00 standards as inappropriate for antidumping review.
Problems will also arise from the difficulty of characterizing agency
determinations as "rulemaking" or "adjudication." In all cases under the
96. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976) provides:
The reviewing court shall-
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to
be-
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law;
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statu-
tory right;
(D) without observance of procedure required by law;
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence . . . reviewed on the record of an
agency hearing provided by statute; or
(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de
novo by the reviewing court.
97. The Treasury Department accords material confidential treatment if disclosure will
cause "substantial harm to the competitive position" of the informant, have a "significantly
adverse effect" upon such person, or "impair the Secretary's ability to obtain necessary infor-
mation in the future." 19 C.F.R. § 153.23(a) (1978). Information usually considered confiden-
tial includes business or trade secrets, production costs, distribution costs unless freely
available, names of particular customers, and the prices at which particular sales occurred. Id
§ 153.23(c). The International Trade Commission follows a similar approach. See Id
§ 201.6(a).
98. See notes 56-62 supra and accompanying text.
99. See notes 50-55 supra and accompanying text.
100. See notes 74-75 supra and accompanying text.
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APA, a reviewing court may set aside agency action that fails to meet statu-
tory, procedural, or constitutional requirements, or is otherwise arbitrary
and capricious.' 0 ' If the action represents rulemaking' 0 2 or adjudica-
tion, 0 3 the standard of substantial evidence will also apply.' 0 4 Anti-
dumping determinations do not fit easily into this construct because they
constitute a mixture of rulemaking and adjudication. Rulemaking is con-
sidered "legislation on the administrative level," directed not so much at
particular parties as towards situations.' 0 5 Dumping orders, although for-
mulated in the context of a particular entry of merchandise, affect future
entries of merchandise of the same kind or class. For this reason, some
consider dumping investigations to be rulemaking.' 0 6
Since the dumping investigation concentrates on a particular importa-
tion of goods and affects the substantial property interests of the importer or
owner of the goods, the proceedings also contain elements of adjudica-
tion.'0 7 The amendments made to the Antidumping Act to provide proce-
dural safeguards for the interested parties manifest some congressional
recognition of the adversarial nature of the proceedings.' 08 The proceed-
ings, however, still fail to conform to the APA's model of adjudication
based on a public hearing. The hearings conducted pursuant to the
Antidumping Act are exempted from the rigorous requirements of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act and are but one factor in each agency's determi-
nation.109 It could be argued that since the administrative actions in
antidumping investigations do not fall entirely within either category of
rulemaking or adjudication, the findings should not be reviewed on the ba-
sis of the substantial evidence standard. The better approach, however,
101. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 413-14 (1971).
102. Rulemaking refers to the "agency process for formulating, amending, or repealing a
rule." 5 U.S.C. § 551(5) (1976). A "rule" is defined as "the whole or a part of an agency
statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, inter-
pret, or prescribe law or policy .. " Id § 551(4).
103. Adjudication is the "agency process for the formulation of an order." Id § 551(7).
An "order" is defined as "the whole or a part of a final disposition ... of an agency in a
matter other than rule making. . . ." Id § 551(6).
104. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 414 (1971).
105. Elof Hansson, Inc. v. United States, 178 F. Supp. 922, 928 (Cust. Ct. 1959), rev'd on
other grounds, 296 F.2d 779 (C.C.P.A. 1960), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 899 (1961).
106. Id
107. See Fisher, supra note 3, at 149; Metzger & Musrey, supra note 65, at 327-28.
108. See text accompanying note 24 supra.
109. The International Trade Commission inserts a boilerplate paragraph into each deter-
mination:
In arriving at its determination the Commission gave due consideration to written
submissions from interested parties, evidence adduced at the hearing, and all factual
information obtained by the Commission from questionnaires, personal interviews,
and other sources.
See, eg., Primary Lead Metal from Australia and Canada, supra note 82, at 17,629.
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would be to acknowledge that the proceedings represent a hybrid of rule-
making and adjudication, and thus should be afforded the added scrutiny
of the substantial evidence test.
The blind application of the Administrative Procedure Act to
antidumping proceedings would fail to ensure effective judicial review.
Such a step must be accompanied by an assessment of the nature of anti-
dumping determinations in order to resolve effectively the issues of review-
ability and the applicable standard of review. Resolving both of these
issues requires clarification of the legislative intent underlying the Anti-
dumping Act, which, in part, explains the courts' reluctance to confront the
issue of the APA's applicability. In addition, the review envisioned by the
Administrative Procedure Act does not fuse easily with the existing provi-
sions of the Antidumping Act. The informality of antidumping proceed-
ings thwarts the courts' efforts conscientiously to assess the bases of the
agency's determination. The need for specifically adapting the standards of
review available under the Administrative Procedure Act to the objectives
embodied in the Antidumping Act is apparent.
B. PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE REFORM: S. 2857
The 96th Congress will attempt to rationalize the administration of the
Antidumping Act through a number of bills,110 the principal one being
S. 2857.111 In its present form, this bill purports to restructure the system
of judicial review of antidumping proceedings by broadening the statutory
scope of review, clarifying the appropriate standard, and extending stand-
ing to challenge determinations of the Treasury Department and the Inter-
national Trade Commission to "[a]ny person adversely affected"' 12 by such
a determination. Unfortunately, the bill does not successfully resolve the
complex issues surrounding these concerns.
The bill does not expressly mandate review of dumping orders or af-
firmative less than fair value and injury determinations."13 It does, how-
ever, acknowledge the judicial expansion of the present statutory scope of
110. See bills cited in note 1 supra.
111. Customs Court Act of 1978, S. 2857, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) [hereinafter cited as S.
2857]. All citations are to the revised draft contained in Hearing on S. 2857, supra note 63, at
270-83. First introduced in the second session of the 95th Congress, the bill must be reintro-
duced before the present Congress may take action upon it. Proponents of the bill expect to
submit a revised draft to Congress in mid-1979. Interview with Michael J. Altier, Deputy
Counsel, Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery, Feb. 2, 1979.
112. S. 2857, supra note Ill, § 601(g) (proposed 28 U.S.C. § 1516(i)(1)).
113. No mention of such review is made in the text of the bill. A summary of the bill's key
reforms similarly omits such review. See Hearing on . 2857, supra note 63, at 56 (Statement
of Barbara Babcock, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice).
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review1 14 by permitting domestic manufacturers and producers to immedi-
ately appeal negative less than fair value and injury determinations.' 15
Thus, the unequal treatment presently accorded importers and domestic
producers will continue under this proposed legislation.
Closely allied to the provision on the scope of judicial review is that
dealing with the standard to be applied in such review. As a consequence
of this relationship, the inequities of the former are not only repeated but
also magnified in the latter. The basic standard of review for appraisal pro-
tests would remain trial de novo.116 However, use of this piercing standard
of review would be hedged with two important qualifications. First, the bill
expressly provides that this standard would not apply to the review of "a
particular issue. . . of a type traditionally viewed as suitable for determi-
nation under any other standard of review."1 17 Presumably this clause
would cover review of the factual determinations underlying dumping find-
ings. 1 18 Even if it is not so interpreted, the bill further provides that nega-
tive less than fair value and injury determinations shall be reviewed
according to the standards enumerated in the Administrative Procedure
Act 119 with the exception of the substantial evidence and trial de novo
standards.120 Thus, the bill appears to provide less extensive review of fac-
tual determinations in actions brought by domestic parties than in those
brought by importers. In reality, the failure to provide explicitly for review
of affirmative dumping findings in actions brought by importers would
limit review in these actions to the Kleberg standard, 121 which is much less
extensive than those of the APA. 122
The treatment on appeal of affirmative and negative determinations
would also differ in the record forwarded to the court.123 An importer ap-
114. See notes 71-72 supra and accompanying text.
115. S. 2857, supra note I11, § 601(e) (proposed 19 U.S.C. § 1516(d)). The right of domes-
tic producers to appeal and contest negative less than fair value determinations was initially
provided by the Trade Reform Act of 1974. See text accompanying note 33 supra.
116. S. 2857, supra note 11, § 402 (proposed 28 U.S.C. §2640).
117. Id (proposed 28 U.S.C. § 2640(a)).
118, See Hearing on S. 2857, supra note 63, at 158 (Statement of Andrew P. Vance, Attor-
ney Representing the Customs Bar).
119. See note 96 supra.
120. S. 2857, supra note 111, § 402 (proposed 28 U.S.C. § 2640(b)).
121. The bill attempts to preserve the standard of review presently applied to affirmative
dumping determinations. The courts have never used the more exacting scrutiny of trial de
novo in such review. See Hearings on S. 2857, supra note 63, at 84 (Statement of Michael H.
Stein, General Counsel, International Trade Commission). See also text accompanying notes
73-75 supra.
122. See text accompanying notes 95-96 supra.
123. The bill would require the Customs Court to "determine the matter upon the basis of
the record made before [it]." S. 2857, supra note 111, § 402 (proposed 28 U.S.C. § 2634(a)).
The record would consist of "(1) consumption or other entry; (2) commercial invoice; (3) spe-
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pealing the imposition of dumping duties presumably could offer the pub-
lished dumping finding and perhaps even a hearing transcript as part of the
record. The evidence compiled in the Customs Court during review of no
injury and negative less than fair value determinations would be far more
comprehensive, however, and would even allow in camera review of confi-
dential information possessed by the International Trade Commission or
Treasury Department.124
The bill would open antidumping protests to "any person adversely
affected or aggrieved" by a negative determination.125 This change would
extend the protection of the antidumping laws to domestic producers en-
gaged in a type of business related to that which is directly affected by the
imported goods as well as those persons employed in the industry directly
experiencing injury. Although these parties may suffer injury as a result of
the importation, they traditionally were denied access to the courts to con-
test dumping determinations. 126 The bill would provide these parties with
limited judicial review of actions taken by the Secretary of the Treasury or
International Trade Commission.
Three limits would be placed on this type of review. First, these parties
could obtain review of an agency determination only after a domestic pro-
ducer protested to the agency and the agency reviewed its own determina-
tion. 127 Thus, in the absence of such a protest, no review would be
available to these adversely affected parties. Second, the power of the re-
viewing court would be limited to affirming the agency decision or remand-
ing it to the agency for further consideration; the reviewing court could not
modify the agency determination.128 Third, the standard of review for "ad-
versely affected" petitioners would be quite restrictive and limit review to
scrutiny of the record of the agency's decision.'2 9 The factual findings of
cial customs invoice; (4) copy of protest; (5) copy of denial of protest in whole or in part; (6)
importer's exhibits; (7) official and/or other representative samples, and (8) any official labora-
tory reports." Id
124. Id (proposed 28 U.S.C. § 2634(b)). In a negative less than fair value appeal, the bill
would-require the Secretary of the Treasury to furnish the "contested determination, the find-
ings or report upon which it is based, a copy of any reported hearings or conferences con-
ducted" and "any documents, comments or other information obtained on a confidential basis
and including with the latter a nonconfidential description of the nature of said confidential
documents, comments, or information." Id Further, "[tihe confidentiality afforded such docu-
ments, comments, or information shall be preserved in the litigation, but the courts may ex-
amine the confidential material in camera if necessary to the disposition of the litigation." Id
A similar provision would govern no injury appeals. Id (proposed 28 U.S.C. § 2634(c)).
125. Id § 601(g) (proposed 19 U.S.C. § 1516(i)(1)).
126. See notes 63-64 supra and accompanying text.
127. S. 2857, sufpra note 111, § 601(g) (proposed 19 U.S.C. § 1516(c)(4)).
128. Id (proposed 19 U.S.C. § 1516(i)(2)).
129. Id
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the Secretary of the Treasury and the International Trade Commission
would be conclusive on the court and the parties, with remand occurring
only if the action was found to be "arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to the
applicable statute." 130
The enactment of this bill would greatly increase the opportunity to
use the Antidumping Act to harass importers with baseless dumping allega-
tions and generally to subvert the Act to serve protectionist ends. The pro-
visions enumerating standing for adversely affected parties lean heavily on
the side of domestic interests. No provision allows a person adversely af-
fected by an affirmative determination to contest it even though the im-
porter of the goods might choose not to pursue his remedy.131 If adversely
affected persons are to be given standing under the Antidumping Act, the
Act should provide for judicial review for persons adversely affected by
affirmative as well as negative determinations. 132 Similarly, if domestic
producers are to be given the right to appeal negative injury determina-
tions, a comparable right to appeal affirmative agency findings should be
provided to importers. 133 Lastly, the same standard-that of substantial
evidence-should apply to the review of all actions brought under the
Act.134 What S. 2857 would provide, then, is increased protection of do-
mestic producers and related parties rather than the necessary clarification
and reform.
C. A SUGGESTION TO FACILITATE EFFECTIVE REVIEW
Legislative action is necessary to rationalize the law governing the re-
view of dumping determinations. Blanket application of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act will not solve the issues surrounding reviewability and
the appropriate standard of review. Enabling legislation would be required
to adapt the Act to the specific problems addressed by the antidumping
laws. Unfortunately, S. 2857 does not ensure effective review because it
fails to offer comprehensive reform.
130. Id (proposed 19 U.S.C. § 1516(i)(3)).
131. See Gerhart, supra note 73, at 1165. Gerhart postulates that an importer possesses no
incentive to contest erroneous decisions of customs officers under the present procedures. But
an importer loses potential business by being forced to raise his prices upon imposition of
dumping duties. Thus, importers of a class or kind of merchandise subjected to a dumping
order possess a substantial economic incentive to contest erroneous orders.
132. One bill currently pending in Congress would amend the Antidumping Act to allow
adversely affected foreign manufacturers this right of protest. S. 223, supra note 1, § 207.
133. S. 223 would explicitly allow review of any finding or order in whole or in part. Id
134. S. 223 would mandate affirmance of agency determinations "if supported by substan-
tial evidence on the record as a whole," irrespective of which party initiates the action. Id
§§ 207-208.
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Any proposal for reform must first outline the scope of review. A pro-
vision should be added to Title 19 of the United States Code expressly au-
thorizing judicial review of dumping orders for their factual bases.' 35 This
would end the current practice of inferring the court's power to review
dumping orders from statutes designed to govern only classification and
appraisal controversies.
Opportunities to contest agency determinations should be provided
equally to importers and domestic producers. Importers should be allowed
to seek review of affirmative less than fair value and injury determinations
and no longer be limited to review of procedural regularity. Domestic pro-
ducers must be provided comparable procedures for review of negative less
than fair value and injury determinations. Since American manufacturers
receive immediate review of negative findings, importers should be treated
equally and not be forced to await the actual liquidation of dumping duties.
An importer whose merchandise is the subject of an antidumping investiga-
tion should be allowed to contest the validity of an dumping order upon its
issuance. To avoid abuse of this right, however, the determination of a
dumping order's validity should be given res judicata effect. In this way,
once the dumping order is upheld, protests would be restricted to issues
involving the action of the customs officer in imposing dumping duties on a
particular entry of merchandise as now governed by existing legislation.
Although this suggestion would separate the determination of the va-
lidity of a dumping order from the protest of the imposition of dumping
duties, it need not unduly prolong the imposition of dumping duties. The
dumping order is a final determination pertaining to a certain class or kind
of imported merchandise; the actual imposition of dumping duties is a
sanction applied to particular entries falling within the scope of the original
dumping order.' 36 Presently, the dumping duties must be liquidated before
the courts will entertain protests of the dumping order or actual assess-
ment.137 In the case of invalid dumping orders, this process is inefficient
and potentially devastating to the importer. 38 It would be just as effi-
cient to allow an importer to contest immediately the dumping order while
permitting customs officers to continue their function of implementing the
135. See Hearing on S. 2857, supra note 63, at 298 (Letter from Gerald O'Brien, American
Importers Association, to Senator DeConcini, Chairman, Subcomm. on Improvements in Ju-
dicial Machinery, July 24, 1978).
136. See Myerson, supra note 11, at 196.
137. There is some support for advancing the date of the imposition of duties by requiring
the payment of estimated duties immediately following an affirmative dumping finding. See
S. 264, supra note 1, § 208; S. 223, supra note 1, § 104. S. 223 would accompany this change
with a provision allowing immediate appeal of affirmative dumping orders. Id § 207.
138. The General Accounting Office estimated the average delay in the liqudation of duties
to be 3 to 3-1/2 years. 125 CdNG. REc. S663 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1979).
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order and calculating the special duties to be assessed. Protests of the impo-
sition of dumping duties would still require liquidation of duties prior to
judicial review. An importer could elect to protest the dumping order and
the assessment separately, but would only bear this added expense after
weighing the strength of his claim against the probability that liquidation
will be unduly delayed by contesting the validity of the order.
In addition to clarifying the scope of review, reform must also resolve
the confusion over the appropriate standard of review. Protests of dumping
findings, whether brought by importers or domestic producers, should be
subject to one standard of review after equivalent records are compiled in
the reviewing courts. Review should not be limited to the arbitrary and
capricious standard which allows a court to uphold an agency action if
some evidence justifies it. Nor should review extend to the substitution of
the court's judgment for that of the agency entrusted with the original de-
termination. The appropriate standard of review should be the substantial
evidence test,139 but the burden should be upon the agency to prove its
action correct.140 Use of this standard would prevent abuses of agency dis-
cretion without involving the reviewing court in the actual determination
process.
The recent amendments to the Antidumping Act facilitate review
under the substantial evidence standard but do not go far enough. The Act
now requires publication of the reasons underlying the dumping order. Re-
view predicated solely on this record is inadequate, however, because the
Secretary of the Treasury and the International Trade Commission often
base their decisions upon confidential information. All information gath-
ered by the relevant agency should be accessible to the reviewing court. If
the evidence contained in the public record does not substantially support
the agency finding, the court should be allowed to conduct in camera re-
view of the confidential information.
The question remains whether a transcript of the hearing conducted at
the request of the parties to an antidumping investigation should be in-
cluded as part of the record considered by the reviewing court. 141 The
hearing procedure developed under the Antidumping Act was not designed
139. This analysis suggests that the arbitrary and capricious, substantial evidence, and de
novo standards of review lie on a continuum with the first representing the least piercing re-
view. At least one noted commentator suggests that the arbitrary and capricious standard has
merged with the substantial evidence standard. See K. DAVIS, supra note 94, at 29.00.
140. This change would amount to a reversal of the present allocation of the burden of
proof. See text accompanying note 74 supra.
141. One bill pending in Congress would include the hearing transcript in the record for-
warded to the reviewing court. S. 223, supra note 1, §§ 207-208.
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to produce a record important to an agency decision. 14 2 In fact, the hearing
fails to further the interest of either party to the investigation and amounts
to little more than an empty gesture. The parties should at least be afforded
the opportunity to test the assertions of their opponents through cross-
examination. Through this reform, the record of the hearing would become
more valuable to a reviewing court as a realistic statement of the contro-
versy rather than a collection of self-serving statements by tle parties. The
danger of such a hearing evolving into a formal and lengthy proceeding is
obvious and the agencies involved must guard against this possibility. Al-
though such a task might be difficult, it is far from impossible.
Finally, standing could be extended to those persons adversely affected
by agency determinations-whether affirmative or negative. Given the ad-
judicatory nature of antidumping investigations and the danger of un-
necessarily prolonging the proceeding, such a provision would be unwise.
Other persons adversely affected indirectly by an antidumping decision
should be allowed to intervene on appeal, but the antidumping protest
should be restricted to those parties with direct interests at stake: the im-
porter of merchandise subjected to dumping duties and representatives of
the industry directly injured.
CONCLUSION
Both Congress and the United States Customs Court recognize the in-
adequacy of the review currently provided under the Antidumping Act. Al-
though the Customs Court possesses some latitude in determining the
appropriate scope of review, the proper solution lies with legislative reform.
Unfortunately, the proposals offered by Congress to date fall short of
providing effective review. Congress must explicitly provide for judicial re-
view of the dumping finding and its factual basis. It must also delineate the
appropriate scope of review--one that will allow the courts to go beyond
"rubber stamping" an agency determination but will not permit the court to
compile and weigh the evidence for itself. Use of the substantial evidence
standard would give the courts this flexibility and ensure that the reasons
given support the determination. Until Congress acts in the manner de-
scribed, judicial review of antidumping proceedings will continue to be cur-
sory and to treat the interested parties unequally.
Sandra E. Lorimer
142. See Hearing on S. 2857, supra note 63, at 84 (Statement of Michael H. Stein, General
Counsel, International Trade Commission).
